Israel and the US have a long standing understanding about many issues
affecting the Middle-East region, but the relationship is a bit complex.
Contrary to popular belief and myths in the Arab world, the role of the US in
1973 was not blatantly biased towards Israel, especially in the early
phase.
‘You are selling out Vietnam;
you will abandon Taiwan. And we will be here when you grow tired of Israel’.
Hafiz al Asad to Henry Kissinger 1973.
‘We live in a world of facts and we can’t build on
hopes and fantasy. The fact is that you have been defeated, so don’t ask for a
victor’s spoil’. Dr. Henry Kissinger’s advice to Anwar Sadat,
1973.
From: Ted Thornton History
of the Middle East Database and http://www.defencejournal.com/2002/nov/4th-round.htm
Henry Kissinger, U.S. Secretary of State, had secretly urged Israel not to launch a preemptive
attack because it would have been too embarrassing for the U.S. Besides,
Sadat had moved his troops around before and no attack had come. On two of these
occasions, Israeli Prime Minister Golda Meir had mobilized Israel's armed forces
at great expense. She did not want to do it again unnecessarily.
The U.S. had been feeding Israel satellite reconnaissance pictures of
Egyptian troop movements for some time prior to the attack. So, the Israelis knew something was up.
On the morning of October 6, Israelis
were pretty sure about the imminent attack and General Elazar had recommended a preemptive
strike. At 10:00 am US Ambassador Kenneth Keating met with Prime Minister
Meir and warned her against a preemptive
strike against the Arabs. He pointedly told her that if such a course of
action was taken by Israel, it will be very difficult for the US to send
military aid. On the basis of this US threat to Israelis not to open fire,
Kissinger called Anatolii Dobrynin (Soviet ambassador in Washington) and told
him to urgently inform Soviet leadership that war is imminent, and on behalf of
Israeli leadership, Kissinger assured Moscow that Israel would not strike first
against the Arabs, but that Israel’s response would be fierce if attacked. The
urgency of the message is evident from the fact that Dobrynin used the White
House telephone system to send it to Moscow. In the early phase of the war US
response was very cautious. The US refrained from accusing the Arabs of
provoking the war. Kissinger rejected initial Israeli requests for military
supplies on October 7.
Back in Egypt, what happened next was something military historians continued
to wrangle over for some time afterward. After digging in, the three Egyptian
armies just sat there and did nothing for the entire week that followed. They
could have advanced and capture much Israeli territory in the Sinai. But they
did not make a move. This was fatal since it gave the Israelis time to dig in
and plan their own attack. Was it just a stupid move? Or a request issued by
Kissinger?
Egypt's allies, the Syrians, were thoroughly bewildered. President Asad sat
in a bunker in Damascus, waiting hour after hour for the Egyptians to move, but
unaware that Sadat had been in constant
secret contact with Henry Kissinger, and had promised Kissinger that Egypt
intended to advance no further (Seale, 208). By the time Asad angrily realized he had been set up by Sadat it was too late. (was
this coordinated by Kissinger?)
The Israelis had figured out what was happening and knew they were free to
redeploy forces to the north to deal with the Syrians. Therefore, Israel
temporarily abandoned efforts on the western front and concentrated on
containing and repelling the Syrian attack from the northeast. The Syrian threat
was perceived as the greater of the two anyway, with the Golan Heights and the
Galilee at stake. The Syrians were soon driven back behind the 1967 armistice
line.
The problem with the Egyptians was that they were as surprised as anyone at
their success up to that point and had not drawn up a battle plan beyond taking
the Bar Lev line. After the war, Army Chief of Staff General Shazli and Sadat traded accusations over this. The
important point is that it was not at all certain that Sadat himself never expected to get across
the canal, and after he did, it may well have been a "total surprise" for
him. It was also a stunning political victory for him and indeed for all
Egypt. Subsequently, the event was remembered with great pride by Egyptians and
October 6 became one of the biggest national holidays.
From: http://www.defencejournal.com/2002/nov/4th-round.htm
Egypt publicly proclaimed its position on October 16. Sadat insisted that
‘the Arabs were seeking not the extermination of Israel but only the restoration
of national honor and the recovery of Arab lands lost in the June War’. The
problem was that this proclamation was made on October 16, when Egyptians had
already failed in their October 14 offensive. Despite the reports of Soviet
supplies, US played down this factor in the beginning. A Pentagon spokesperson
stated that, ‘The Arabs have gotten some of their honor back, and we don’t want
the Israelis to take it away. It’s time to settle’.
When Britain stopped arms
supplies to the Middle East, it only affected Israel as it had Centurion tanks
(British tanks). Arab countries got supplies from the Soviet Union and they had
no British military hardware (with the exception of Jordan).
The opinions regarding US
re-supply of Israel varied at different branches of US government. The State
Department, a small faction at the Pentagon, and some legislatures (Senator
Fulbright and Senate Majority leader, Mansfield) were of the view that if a
standoff occurs in Sinai with no clear winner, there will be room for diplomatic
maneuvering, since no victor was going to relinquish its gains thus making any
negotiations very difficult. This approach didn’t mean that the US would allow
Israel to be defeated decisively (the chances of which were almost nil) by Arabs
supported by Soviet arms. Nixon's decision to supply Israelis on a large scale
was based on increased Soviet
supplies to Arabs, refusal of
Soviets to coordinate with the US to bring a ceasefire, and reconnaissance
report of this activity. The first US supplies arrived at Israel's Lod airport
on October 14. By October 17, twenty Phantoms had arrived in Israel followed by
an air bridge which brought a large amount of military supplies (including
laser-guided smart bombs, cluster bombs, A-4E Skyhawk fighters, CH-53
helicopters, tanks, TOW anti tank missiles, and ammunition) to Israel. None of
the NATO allies agreed to facilitate this airlift, which caused friction in
their relations with the US. Downed Israeli aircrafts were quickly replaced,
some even taken from the US active air force units (F-4s from an Air Force Base
in North Carolina and the Sixth Fleet in the Mediterranean, and Skyhawk A-4s
from the Navy Fighter Weapons School at Miramar, California). Evidently, the US
was fully aware of the importance of air operations. US supplies continued to
arrive till November 14.
The signing of peace treaties
with Jordan and Egypt can be attributed to this war. The middle-eastern restored
honor allowed sworn enemies to sit together and sign peace treaties. The October
War convinced Israel that it has to accept a settlement, where security is
achieved through emphasis on political stability rather than overwhelming
military dominance. Even after signing peace treaties with Jordan and Egypt, the
Palestinian problem has not been resolved. At the end of the day, Israelis have
to deal directly with Palestinians and strive to achieve a political settlement
in a give and take manner. History has proven time and again that viable
solutions can only be achieved through political means. Military power,
regardless of how overwhelming it might be, can never solve a crisis as
effectively.
An astute observer had predicted
in 1974 that the rich oil producing Arabs ‘have to defend themselves and their
riches against far more immediate and real dangers than Israel’. The Iran-Iraq
war in 80s, Iraqi invasion of Kuwait in 1990, and the presence of US forces in
Saudi Arabia is a grim testimony to that prophecy.
Compiled By: Albert Talker
Submitted to Web: Albert Talker
Sources:
This article uses quoted text in its original format for the purpose of
keeping the authenticity of text quoted from the sources:
Ted Thornton History
of the Middle East Database:
http://www.defencejournal.com/2002/nov/4th-round.htm